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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 14,3 37

vs.
DANIEL L. PECK,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in which the defendant
was charged with aggravated assault and was found to be auilty in
that he did, with unlawful force and violence, knowingly and intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried on March 20, .1975, before a jury.

The

State accused the defendant of violating 76-5-102 (1) (2). and 76-5103(1) (a), Utah Criminal Code Amended, which violations are a felony of the third degree.

The jury found the defendant guilty as

charged.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Daniel Peck was charged with the offense of aggravated assault.

The alleged assau.lt rose out of a fist fight involving

Daniel Peck, Jimmy Peck, Clarence "Junior" Nielson, Jr., and Garv
Ewell.

The fight occurred on Saturday, December 7, 1974, at apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
. ••
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proximately 1:15 p.m., in American Fork, Utah.

(Tr. 14)

Accusations by Junior Nielson that the Peck boys had stolen
some Christmas trees led to the fracus.

The incident eventually

leading to the fight was a night-time visit to Jimmy Peck's home
on December 7, 1974, at 1:00 a.m. by Clarence Nielson.

Nielson,

the owner of a Christmas tree lot in American Fork, told Jimmy's
wife that the Peck brothers had stolen Christmas trees from him.
The next morning, Jimmy Peck's wife told him of these accusations
made by Nielson.
Nielson.

The charges so incensed Jimmy that he telephoned

A heated conversation ensued.

The aftermath was that

Ewell and Nielson were challenged to a fist fight.

Ewe11 and

Nielson responded and met the two Peck brothers at Sam White's
lane in American Fork.

(Tr* 15)

Junior Nielson and Jimmy Peck squared off while Ewell and
Danny Peck watched.

The Peck boy appeared to be winning the

fight when Junior, (Tr. 17) who had a headhold on Jimmy (Tr. 3 4)
then let him go and stopped fighting, whereupon Ewell, fresh and
well-rested, commenced to fight a tired Jimmy Peck, who doggedly
fought Ewell all the while retreating down the street.
tinued to fight out into an open field.

They con-

Danny Peck and Junior

Nielson watched and were joined by Harry Peacock, who also was
a spectator.

(Tr. 15)

The State claims that at this point, when the fighters were
in the field and the fight was almost finished, that Daniel Peck,
of diminutive size, who had been an observer watching from his
vehicle suddenly emerged with a slag hammer and "rushed over,
took a swing with the slag hammer, and tore Gary Ewell's eye
out."

(Tr. 6)
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Danny Peck claims he thought his brother was being killed by
Junior Nielson and Gary Ewell when they both had Jimmy down, one
gouging Jimmy's eyes, and the other getting him by the hair so they
could either kick or hit him in the face*

At this point, Danny,

thinking his brother's life was endangered, intervened with a piece
of metal and struck Junior, who was gouging Jimmy's eyes.

Gary

Ewell, who lost his eye, was in back of Danny Peck and as Danny
turned, "the metal apparently hit Ewell in the eye."
Jimmy Peck testified:

(Tr. 10)

(Tr. 69)

. . .He (Nielson) hit me and I fell down, and
he crawled on top of me and was hitting me, and
I rolled over on my stomach to cover myself up
so he couldn't hit me in the face. I just rolled over on my stomach and he was on my back, Junior was, and he was hitting me on the back, and
he grabbed me by the face like this and tried to
pull my head up. He had his fingers in my face
like this and digging my face and eyes trying
to pull my face up. I had my head down and my
hands up- trying — so he couldn't hit me, and
then someone come over and grabbed me by the
hair of the head trying to pull my head up.
The defendant, Daniel Peck, testified:

(Tr. 78)

A. At that time Junior was on Jimmy's back and
had his fingers in his eyes pulling his head
back, and Ewell had his head up like that by the
hair and was lifting his head up and either Junior or Ewell, one of them, was saying, "Get
his head up to where I can get him or kick him."
something to that effect.
Q.

What was your reaction to this at this time?

A. Well, I could see they wasn't going to quit
and I had asked them three or four times. And
I didn't know what else to do, so I just —
Q.

What did you say to them?

A. I told them to quit and leave him alone, and
Junior pushed me back in the car and took a swing
at me the first time, and then I asked them three
or four times to quit and leave him alone and
quit pounding on him, and they just —
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. What was Ewell doing particularly as far as
Jimmy was concerned?
A. He had him by the hair of the head and was
lifting him up by the hair of the head and he
had his hand back like that. (Indicating)
Q.

What did you do?

A. I jumped out of the car and I grabbed this
bar that I had in the back of the car and I hit
Junior with it and he fell off, and as I did I
seen Ewell coming and I turned around like that,
and when I did that is when it hit Ewell.
Q.

Did you swing the bar at Ewell?

A.

I didn't swing it at him actually, no.

Q.

What did you do?

You say you turned around.

A. I seen him coming when I hit Junior, and I
turned around like that and I felt it hit him.
Then I looked at him and he had his hands on his
eye, and then that was the first I even knew I
had hit him.
POINT I
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF SIMPLE ASSAULT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT WOULD BE WARRANTED BY
ANY REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.
The well-established general rule is that a jury should be
instructed on lesser-included offenses when such a conviction
would be warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence.

Sec-

tion 77-33-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides:
The jury may find the defendant quilty
of any offense the commission of which is
necessarily included in that with which he
is charged in the indictment or information,
or of an attempt to commit the offense.
The offense of simple assault is necessarily included in the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
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State v. Hun-

ter, 20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P. 2d 208 (1968); State v. Barkas, 91
Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130.(1937); State v, Nielson, 30 Utah 2d 19,
514 P.2d 535 (1973).

The elements of assault are common in both

offenses.
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the general rule requiring the submission of lesser-included offenses when the evidence
and circumstances so justify.

State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130,

185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d
618 (1969); State v. Gilliam, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970).
As case authority, defendant cites State v. Close, 28 Utah
2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972), in which the defendant was charged
with indecent assault on a child under fourteen years of age while
in a public swimming pool in the middle of the afternoon while he
was playing with a number of children and performing various gvmnastics by tossing them about and flipping them over in the water.
After being convicted, the defendant, on appeal, complained of
the court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of simple assault.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed for

failure to so instruct and Justice Crockett, speaking for the
Court, said:
Though it is not our prerogative to
pass upon the weight or credibility of the
evidence, we are concerned with whether
there is a basis therein which would justify a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense.
Id. at 288.
It was held error for the trial court to not so instruct on the
lesser-included offense because there was a basis in the evidence
that would justify a quilty verdict on the lesser-included offense
Even the rationale of Justice El "Lett's dissent in State v.
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Close, supra, supports appellant1s position.

Justice Ellett, dis-

senting, stated:
The law seems to be that the failure to
instruct on a lesser and included offense
would be error only if the defendant can show
that the jury upon evidence before it might
rationally acquit him of the greater charge
and convict him of the lesser. Id» at 289.
In accord with the dissent, the defendant presented evidence in
the instant case that might lead the jury to rationally acquit
him of the greater charge of aggravated assault and still convict
him of the lesser charge of simple assault.
Simple assault is statutorily defined as "an attempt, with
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another."
Aggravated assault is statutorily defined as involving one who
"uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury."
The instructions given as to the crime alleged must be applicable to the testimony introduced at trial.

In the instamt case,

there was evidence in the record that Daniel Peck thought that
Jimmy Peck's life was endangered*

Danny Peck testified (Tr. 7 8 ) :

A. At that time Junior was on Jimmy's back
and had his fingers in his eyes pulling his head
back, and Ewell had his head up like that by the
hair and was lifting his dead up and either Junior or Ewell, one of them, was saying, "Get his
head up to where I can get him or kick him," something to that effect.
Q.

What was your reaction to this at this

time?
A. Well, I could see they wasn't going to
quit and I had asked them three or four times*
And I didn't know what else to do, so I just —
Danny Peck testified he did not intend to cause serious bodily injury to Gary Ewell.

He was only trving to defend his bro-
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ther from what appeared to him to have become a deadly assault
by two persons against Jimmy Peck.

Daniel Peck testified to

the effect that he had no intention of injuring Gary Ewell.

(Tr.

80) '
A. I seen him (Gary Ewell) coming when I
hit Junior, and I turned around like that and I
felt it hit him. Then I looked at him and he
had his hand on his eye, and then that was the
first I even knew I had hit him.
Q.

Did you intend to hit Ewell at that

A.

No, I didn't.

time?

The blow struck was accidental.

It is clearly inferable from the

defendant's testimony that he did not have the intent to commit
serious bodily injury required of the crime of aggravated assault
and instead could be found quilty of the lesser-included offense
of simple assault.

Daniel Peck, by his own testimony, raised

the issue of his state of mind as to whether
bodily injury to the victim.

he intended serious

He clearly testified of a lack of

intent to do serious bodily injury to Ewell.
As further case authority, appellant cites State v. Barkas,
supra, in which defendant Barkas, who was a sheep-herder, was
with his sheep in;the mountains west of Bingham when Cordova, a
former sheep-herder of Barkas 1 , climbed up to the mountains toward the camp to collect the sum of $4.28 which he claimed Barkas
owed him.

As Cordova came over a ridge, he saw Barkas coming

over the next ridge and went down into the draw and met him.
Barkas who had a shotgun in his right hand and a revolver in his
left, asked Cordova what he was doing there.
had come up to collect the $4.28 due him.

Cordova replied he

Without further words

Barkas raised both weapons and pointed them at Cordova.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Cordova

grabbed the hand that held the revolver and attempted to push it
down.

Barkas tried to raise the arm and pistol.

In the struggle,

the pistol was discharged, wounding Cordova in the leg.
under orders, started down the trail.

Cordova,

After going about 100

yards, Barkas ordered him to stop and pull down his pants to see
if he had been shot.

Cordova replied that he had not been hit.

Barkas then accused Cordova of being up there stealing sheep.
Barkas was prosecuted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to do bodily harm and was convicted.

On appeal, Barkas raised the

issue of whether the trial court should have properly instructed
on the lesser-included offense of simple assault.

The Utah Sup-

reme Court said such an instruction should have been given and
reversed the trial court's decision, stating;
And if the jury believed Cordova's story
of how the shooting occurred, they might well
find a verdict on a lesser charge. Cordova
testified that without words spoken defendant
pointed a pistol at him with one hand, and a
shotgun with the other hand, and demanded to
know what he was doing there* This, if done
with the intention of frightening, or intimidating or interfering with Cordova would constitute a technical or simple assault, which
is a threat or attempt to interfer with one's
sense or feeling of physical security and put
one in fear for his safety. Cordova further
testified that he grabbed defendant's pistol
arm, and in the struggle the pistol was discharged wounding him in the leg. This is not
inconsistent with the conviction that the
shooting was accidental and not done intentionally to hurt Cordova, in which event it
would only be a simple assault. Such conclusions are not beyond reason, and the jurv
should have been permitted to consider them
and pass upon them. Id. at 1132 & 1133.
(emphasis added)
In both State V. Barkas, supra, and the instant case, the
defendants were charged with assault with a deadly weapon.

In

both cases the defendant testified that the wound inflicted was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
- 8 -may contain errors.

accidental.

The crime of simple assault may be committed by a

wanton or reckless act.

6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, §3 4.

It is defendant's contention that if the victim was not wounded
intentionally but rather was wounded accidentally as a result
of defendant's wanton and reckless act then there would be committed only a simple assault.

Such a conclusion is not beyond

reason in the instant case because there was evidence before
the trier of facts indicating that such was the case.
In State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 230 P. 349- (1924), the defendant was charged with an assault with intent to feloniously
and by force and violence carnally know and ravish a married woman not his wife.

Defendant's counsel requested the court to

charge that although the defendant was charged with the offense
of assault to commit rape, the jury might neverthe less find him
quilty of simple assault.

The court refused to so charge and

counsel assigned the court's refusa] as constituting prejudicial
error.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's con-

viction stating:
It might well be the case that, although
a trial court had refused or omitted to submit to the jury the question of included or
lesser offenses, the judgment would nevertheless not be reversed for that reason alone,
if the evidence was of such a nature as would
not justify a finding of an included or lesser
offense. In such event no prejudice would result from the mere fact that the question of
included or lesser offenses was not submitted
to the jury. It is, however, always a
delicate matter for a trial court to withhold
from the jury the right to find the accused
quilty of a lesser or included offense, and
determine the question of the state of the
evidence as matter of law. That should be
done only in very clear cases. Id. at 350.
The state of the evidence in the instant case is not so clear cut
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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as to require an instruction only on aggravated assault.
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the Utah Supreme
Court.

See Holland v. State, 414 P.2d 590 (Okla.,1966), in which

the Nevada Supreme Court stated:
. . .it was not incumbent upon the
court to instruct on the lesser offense
if the evidence clearly shows the commission of the more serious crime charged
and no other interpretation of the defendant's conduct was reasonably possible.
Id. at 591.
The evidence in the instant case did not unequivocably and clearly show guilt above the lesser—included offense of simple assault.
The evidence in the instant case was insufficient to remove a
reasonable doubt, which might be in the minds of the jury, as to
Danny Peck f s intent.

Under the same evidence, Peck might be

found quilty of simple assault because the proof necessary to
establish the intent to use a deadly weapon to inflict serious
bodily injury or death upon Gary Ewell was lacking but there was
sufficient evidence to establish the crime of simple assault upon
the victim.

Also see State v. Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 548, 484 P.2d

768 (1971); Gist v. State, 509 P.2d 149 (Okla, 1973); People v.
Velasquez, 497 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1972).

Also see State v. Lytle, 177

Kan. 408, 280 P.2d 924 (1955), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas
stated:
There is no doubt that the trial court
in any criminal proceeding must instruct on
all lesser degrees of the crime charged irrespective of the weight of evidence touching thereon if there is any evidence. Id. at
928.
(emphasis added)
The late timing of defendants exceptions to the instructions
which were done after the jury returned a verdict is not fatal to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-10Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

its appeal.

Judge Henroid, in State v. Close, supra, stated:

Hence, an objection or exception taken
after the jury's retirement, for my money is
just as valid an exception,—and more s o , —
than one taken before—and has as much stature .
on appeal in spite of the dissent1s implication
that"is hasn f t. The fact that the exception
was made after the jury verdict seems inconsequential. Id, at 289.
Danny Peck, the defendant, was charged with aggravated assault.

Under a reasonable view of the evidence, the accused

could have been found guilty of simple assault and, therefore,,
it was prejudicial error and deprived him of a substantial right
when the court failed to instruct on simple assault.
POINT II
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE COURT TO PREVENT THE DEFENDANT FROM TESTIFYING AS TO HIS STATE OF MIND BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE
WAS ESSENTIAL TO DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF DEFENSE OF A THIRD PARTY.
The state of mind of the defendant in assault cases is important in the determination of whether a person is privileged to
defend a third person from serious harm.

Judge Sorensen did not

allow Daniel Peck to testify as to his state of mind.

(Tr. 78 and

79)
Q. What was your apprehension, if any,
as far as your brother concerned?
MR. WOOTTON:
THE COURT:

We object.
I will sustain the objection.

Q. (By Mr. Lewis) Tell us what vour
reaction was at this time.
A*

Well, it looked to me like

MR. WOOTTON:

—

We object.

THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
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He can testify as to what hapuened and what
was said, Mr* Lev/is. Not his personal feeling.
"•MR* LEWIS: I think I am entitled to inquire the reason therefor*
THE COURT:
Proceed.

I will sustain the objection.

The intention of Danny Peck v/as an integral part of his plea of
self-defense.

In Carter v. State, 507 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1973), the

Court stated:
The law recognizes that a person is
privileged to defend a third person from
harm under the same conditions and by the
same means as though under and by which he
is privileged to defend himself, if he
reasonably believes that the circumstances
are such as to give the third person such
a privilege of self-defense, his intervention is necessary for the protection of
the third person, and the third person is
a member of his immediate family or a person whom he is under a legal or socially
recognized duty to protect. Restatement,
Torts, §76. 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, §152. Id. at 933 and 934. (emphasis
added)
The general rule is stated in 1 Jones on Evidence, §4:55
(6th ed. 1972), thus:
While there are authorities holding
that a party may not testify directly
concerning his own uncommunicated mental
status, motives or intent, and that such
matters must be shown by proof of facts and
circumstances attending the transaction
in dispute, it is the general rule, applicable in civil and criminal cases alike,
and sustained by the great weight of authority, that whenever the motive, intention
or belief of a person is in issue, the
direct testimony of such person whether
he is a party to the suit or not, is relevant to the issue of such motive, intent
or belief, notwithstanding the fact that
his interest may tend to diminish the
credit to be accorded to his testimony.
Such testimony has been admitted in varyDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-12Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

ing situations.
Such testimony was admitted in State v. Stenbach, 78 Utah
350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), in which the Utah Supreme Court, in reversing a conviction of murder in the first degree, stated:
The question of whether the defendant
did or did not intend to kill the deceased
goes to the very essence of the crime
charged. "In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 7908. The
intention to take the life of Mrs. Mantyla
is an essential an element of the crime of
murder in the first degree as is the killing itself. We quote the following from
Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d Ed.)
vol. 2, § 713, pp. 1336, 1337: "Now that .
defendants are permitted to testify in
their own behalf, there can be no valid reason assigned why they should not be allowed
to testify to the intent with which any act
was done, where such intent is a fact necessary to be ascertained." Id. at 1056 and
1057/
Judge Sorensen's failure to allow the defendant to testify
as to his intention was prejudicial because it emasculated the
defendant's plea of self-defense.
CONCLUSION
The Court's failure to allow the defendant to testify as to
his intention and its failure to instruct on simple assault deprived the defendant of precious and fundamental rights and violated the principle that the Court must submit the case to the
jury for consideration on every degree of assault which the evidence, in any reasonable view, suggests, therefore, the verdict
should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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